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Abstract: The orthodox monadic determination thesis holds that we represent 
colour relations by virtue of representing colours. Against this orthodoxy, I 
argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without representing any 
colours. I present a model of iconic perceptual content that allows for such 
primitive relational colour representation, and provide four empirical arguments 
in its support. I close by surveying alternative views of the relationship between 
monadic and relational colour representation. 
 
Suppose you view a banana next to a strawberry. You perceptually represent the banana as 
yellow and the strawberry as red. You also perceptually represent the banana as yellower than 
the strawberry, and the strawberry as redder than the banana. The orthodox view is that you 
represent these relations by virtue of representing the monadic colours of the banana and the 
strawberry. This view is intuitive, and deeply rooted within the philosophy of colour (Section 
1). Against the orthodoxy, I argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without 
representing any colours.1 Section 2 presents a model of iconic perceptual content that allows 
for such primitive relational colour representation. Section 3 provides four empirical 
                                                        
1 ‘Colour’ here means chromatic colour. 
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arguments in its support. Section 4 surveys alternative views of the relationship between 
monadic and relational colour representation. 
 A brief clarification, before we begin. My argument concerns our visual perceptual 
representation of colour relations, rather than visual experience per se. I explain my reasons 
at length elsewhere (Davies, 2018). By ‘visual perceptual representation,’ I mean a state of 
the visual perceptual system that is type-individuated by its accuracy conditions. An example 
of a relational colour representation, then, would be a state type-individuated by the accuracy 
condition that the banana is yellower than the strawberry. I assume, minimally, that some 
aspects of the character of our visual experience of colour relations supervene on such 
representational states. As such, some of my arguments appeal to differences in visual 
phenomenology to support claims about relational colour representation. Other arguments, 
however, exclusively appeal to neural and functional facts about the colour vision system.  
1. The Monadic Determination Thesis 
Evie wants to paint a picture of a banana next to a strawberry. She especially wants to depict 
that the banana is yellower than the strawberry, and the strawberry redder than the banana. 
How will Evie represent these colour relations? Easy! She applies yellow paint to represent the 
banana here, red paint to represent the strawberry there, and ipso facto represents that the 
banana is yellower than the strawberry. Indeed, this seems like the only way for Evie to 
represent such relations. Painting is a monadic business: her palette contains red and yellow 
paints, but no ‘redder than’ or ‘yellower than’ paints. 
 The orthodox view is that Evie’s visual perceptual representation of colour relations 
works in a similar way. She perceptually represents the banana as yellower than the strawberry, 
and the strawberry as redder than the banana, by virtue of perceptually representing the banana 
as yellow and the strawberry as red. More generally, our perceptual representation of monadic 
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colours determines our perceptual representation of colour relations. Call this the Monadic 
Determination Thesis (MDT). 
 The MDT is an intuitive view. By analogy, it is natural to think that perceptually 
representing objects as having particular spatial locations determines our representation of their 
spatial relations. Equally intuitively, perceptually representing the crash and the bang as 
occurring at times t1 and t2 determines our representation of the bang succeeding the crash. 
Part of the MDT’s appeal derives from the well-worn, putative, analogy between visual 
perception and painting. Locke (1975: II, ix, 8) remarked that the ‘ideas we receive by 
sensation’ are of a ‘plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting.’ Hume (2000: 56) 
claimed that ‘all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, appear as if painted on a plain 
surface.’ Just as painters represent objects via dabs of coloured paint on a surface, for Locke 
and Hume, visual representations comprise an array of ‘sensible points,’ or ‘atoms or 
corpuscles’ endowed with colour. If visual perception is structured this way, the MDT seems 
inevitable. 
 The MDT also coheres with the standard metaphysical view that objects’ intrinsic 
properties determine their relational properties. As Ladyman (2014: §4) notes, 
 
The idea that there could be relations which do not supervene on the non-relational 
properties of their relata runs counter to a deeply entrenched way of thinking… [I]t is 
often assumed that a structure is fundamentally composed of individuals and their 
intrinsic properties, on which all relational structure supervenes. 
 
In the case of colour, moreover, Pautz (2006: 554) argues that 
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It seems perceptually obvious that the fact that blue resembles purple more than green 
obtains by virtue of the intrinsic character of the colours. To see that the colours fall 
into this resemblance order, you only need to focus on the colours themselves. 
 
The standard metaphysical view is ‘perceptually obvious’, Pautz claims, because we can see 
that blue resembles purple more than green, just by virtue of seeing blue, purple, and green.2 
As should be clear, Pautz’s justification for the ontological thesis assumes the MDT. 
There are two main ways to develop the MDT. Developed metaphysically, the view is 
that monadic colour representations fully ground relational colour representations.3 The view 
implies that, necessarily, any change in relational colour representation entails a change in 
monadic colour representation. Developed causally, the view is that our cognitive architecture 
contains mechanisms taking monadic colour representations as inputs, yielding relational 
representations as outputs. As a toy example, suppose that Evie’s visual system represents the 
strawberry as red23 and the banana as yellow17. For convenience, assume that perceptually 
representing a monadic colour involves attributing proportions or magnitudes of the elemental 
colours red, green, yellow, and blue.4 Our hypothetical mechanism ‘reads off’ the proportions 
of redness and yellowness attributed to the strawberry and banana, computes their comparative 
values, and outputs the representation that the strawberry is redder than the banana. 
The model of perceptual content developed below undermines both readings of the 
MDT. The model shows how a perceptual state might represent colour relations without 
                                                        
2 I discuss issues regarding colour similarity and colour ontology in Davies (2014). 
3 Papineau (2015) calls this ‘the orthodox view’; Morrison (2015) labels it ‘colour atomism’. I discuss 
connections with these authors in Section 4. 
4 See Byrne & Hilbert (2003) on hue magnitudes . 
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representing any colours. Against the metaphysical MDT, such cases establish the possibility 
of changes in relational colour representation without changes in monadic colour 
representation, because no monadic colour representation. The case against the causal MDT is 
more complex, and warrants independent development. Roughly, visual systems to which this 
model applies, in some circumstances, could compute relational colour representations without 
having computed any monadic colour representations. 
2. The Chromatic Edge Model 
This Section introduces a model of perceptual content that allows for the primitive 
representation of colour relations: the chromatic edge model. Regarding product 
differentiation, Mandik (2014: 230) argues that linguaform models of perceptual content may 
allow cases where subjects perceive an F-relation between x and y, without attributing any 
particular F-property to x or y. My view is novel in that it develops a model of iconic, rather 
than discursive, representational content. This is a harder task, as theories of iconic 
representation typically follow the empiricists in assuming that the syntactic primitives are 
‘points’ or ‘pixels’ with monadic colour properties.5 
2.1 Topographic Maps 
Advocates of iconic theories of perceptual content sometimes motivate the view by noting 
that visual representation is more like that of maps than natural language.6 I develop this 
analogy by considering topographic maps, which represent terrain or relief using contour 
lines, curves connecting contiguous points of equal elevation. The map legend will include a 
contour interval specifying the difference in elevation between each successive contour line. 
                                                        
5 Kosslyn et al. (2006: 11-12): ‘symbols belong to two form classes: points and empty space… The points can 
vary in size, intensity, and colour.’ 
6 Burge (2010: 540): ‘the elements in perception are organized nonpropositionally. Let us suppose that they are 
organised in ways that are structurally isomorphic with a topological or geometrical structure. Think of a map… 
In vision, the elements in perception have something like the form of a map or sketch from an egocentric 
perspective.’ 
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Please cite published version. 
14/01/2020 
 
6 
 
Standard contour lines indicate increases in elevation; hachured contour lines indicate 
decreases in elevation. In Figure 1, contour lines A, B, C, and D join points of equal 
elevation, with a contour interval of 10m.7 The points joined by B therefore are 10m higher 
than the points joined by A. The points joined by the hachured line D are 10m lower than the 
points joined by C. 
 
Figure 1 
Contour lines represent comparative elevations between two or more sets of points, 
without representing the particular elevations of those points. In the diagram above, the 
contour lines suffice to determine the comparative heights of the points connected by lines A 
and B, and lines C and D. In practice, topographic maps normally include reference contour 
lines labelled with specific elevations. Labelling A as 130m, for example, would enable us to 
calculate that B joins points at 140m. This is crucial information in navigation. Such 
references are not mandatory, however, and contour lines per se do not represent monadic 
elevation properties. 
Now consider a simple colour topography map, as in Figure 2b. The map represents 
the scene in Figure 2a via colour contour lines that enclose regions with coordinates 
corresponding to the spatial locations of the disc and square. The colour contours also 
represent the colour relations between regions. Schematically, a contour with colour C, which 
segregates a region from its immediate surround, represents that the region is C-er than its 
                                                        
7 Please see the online version of this paper for colour images. 
B 
A 
D 
C 
Contour interval: 10m 
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surround. In Figure 2b, the red contour represents that the disc is redder than its immediate 
surrounds, and the yellow contour represents that the square is yellower than its immediate 
surrounds. We could complicate the syntax by allowing variations in the width of colour 
contours, for example, to represent variations in the magnitude of colour variation, with 
thicker lines corresponding to larger magnitudes. 
   
    (a)     (b)  
Figure 2 
2.2. Edge Representation in Visual Perception 
Our simple colour topography map represents directions and even magnitudes of colour 
contrast via features of colour contour lines. The edges that we perceive obviously are not like 
this: they lack width, and do not appear to have monadic colour properties. Nevertheless, edges 
do visually appear in certain ways to us. With Casati and Varzi (1999: 71), I assume that edges 
and other boundaries are ‘bona fide spatial entities’ that ‘enter the content of our perceptions.’ 
I focus on edge representations with iconic formats. Iconic representations are holistic, 
in that they lack canonical decompositions into syntactic constituents that separately denote 
individuals and features.8 Consider a photograph of Big Ben. There is no way to decompose 
this photograph into constituent elements that separately encode the individual, Big Ben, and 
its features, such as its height, colour, and texture. Any constituent part of the image represents 
a part of Big Ben, but also represents the features of that part. Contrast this with a discursive 
                                                        
8 Quilty-Dunn (2017: 63). 
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representation such as ‘Big Ben is tall,’ which has a canonical decomposition into the 
primitives ‘Big Ben’ and ‘tall’, separately denoting an individual and a feature. 
I assume, then, that an iconic visual representation of an edge will holistically encode 
features such as – at a minimum – its curvature, length, and orientation (C.f. Burge, 2014: 493). 
In addition, I assume that an edge between two regions will be represented as belonging to, or 
‘owned’ by, just one of those regions. In this respect, edge representation has a classical 
topology. In viewing Figure 2a, for example, we perceptually represent the edge between the 
disc and the black background as belonging to the disc, and the edge between the square and 
the disc as belonging to the square. These representations are part of the standard explanation 
of the figure-ground organisation of the scene, wherein the disc appears as figure against a 
black ground, while the square appears as figure against a red ground.9 One might object that 
we sometimes perceive boundaries between objects lacking an obvious figure-ground 
organisation. Does the edge between the squares in Figure 3 appear to belong to the red or 
yellow square? The answer is unclear.10 Perhaps we will have to abandon the classical topology 
in such cases. Here I proceed on the simplifying assumption. 
 
Figure 3 
2.3 Directed Chromatic Contrast Properties 
On my view, visual edge representation attributes chromatic features, along with geometric 
features such as curvature and length, and topological features such as ownership relations. 
These features are directed chromatic contrast properties, or chromatic contrasts for short. 
                                                        
9 I discuss the role of edge representations in figure-ground in Davies (m.s.). 
10 Smith (1998/99), Casati (2003). 
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The chromatic contrast of an edge specifies the type of chromatic variation obtaining between 
the regions bounded by that edge. Take the edge between the yellow square and the red disc 
in Figure 2a. We can gloss its chromatic contrast as: owned by a region that is n units 
yellower than its immediate neighbouring region. 
We can use chromatic contrast vectors to model the content involved in representing 
such contrast properties. To simplify, assume a standard three-dimensional opponent colour 
space, with x, y, and z axes corresponding to red-green (RG), yellow-blue (YB), and black-
white (BW) dimensions.11 Neutral grey is mapped to the point (0, 0, 0). We represent 
increases in redness, yellowness, and blackness via increases in x, y, and z values 
respectively, and represent increases in greenness, blueness, and whiteness via decreases in x, 
y, and z values respectively. We can then represent colour variations via vectors of the form 
 
 
 
 
 , where positive a, b, and c, values represent magnitudes of change in the direction of 
redness, yellowness, and blackness respectively, and negative a, b, and c, represent 
magnitudes of change in the direction of greenness, blueness, and whiteness respectively. 
Thus for example    
 
  and     
 
  represent different magnitudes of variation in the direction of 
redness;    
 
  and     
 
  represent variations of equal magnitude in the opposing directions of 
redness and greenness;    
 
  and    
 
  represent variations of equal magnitude in the orthogonal 
directions of redness and yellowness; and so on. 
Think of these vectors as mappings from one location (though no particular location) 
in colour space to another. As noted above, edges are represented as belonging to one, and 
only one, of the regions bounded by the edge. When a contrast vector is attributed to an edge, 
                                                        
11 I do not ultimately think that the familiar opponent colour space is appropriate to model the chromatic 
contrasts attributed in visual edge representations. I use the opponent colour space here and throughout for 
heuristic purposes. 
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the syntax of this representation dictates that the vector always ‘points’ in the direction of the 
region that owns the boundary. To illustrate, suppose that we attribute     
 
  to the circular 
boundary in Figure 2a. We thereby represent that the disc is 17 (arbitrary) units redder than 
its background, because we represent this boundary as being owned by the disc, rather than 
the background. 
Regarding precedents, Clark (2000: 126ff) distinguishes ‘occupant coding’ of colour, 
which represents monadic point values, and ‘difference coding’, which codes chromatic 
contrasts. Clark’s (2000: 130-1) view is that ‘the informative or content-bearing elements are 
not the swaths of constant hue, but the edges, where things change.’ He suggests that 
‘detecting colour differences can help identify what type of edge it is: as one where spectral 
properties change... [T]he suggested content of chromatic sensory states is something like 
“here things get redder,”’ (2000: 128, fn. 38). My view cashes out this suggestion in terms of 
the attribution of chromatic contrast vectors to edges, within a topologically structured 
representation that encodes boundary-ownership relations. The following Section also 
presents four new arguments in its support. 
3. Arguments for the chromatic edge model 
3.1. Liebmann Effects 
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Figure 4 
In colour contrast cases, the appearance of an object’s monadic colour varies with changes in 
surrounding context. In Figure 4, the central rectangles in each pair of images have the same 
surface spectral reflectance properties, but appear strikingly different depending on the colour 
of the surround.12 Less frequently noted, but equally obvious, is that differences in chromatic 
contrast also influence the appearance of edges. Consider the two purplish rectangles against 
the blue and green backgrounds. The edges of the left rectangle appear less distinct than the 
right rectangle. The same applies to the right greenish rectangle against the cyan background, 
whose edges appear less pronounced than the left greenish rectangle against the yellow 
background. Moreover, to my eye, the blue-green edge in the top left of Figure 4 differs in 
quality from the red-blue edge in the top right. Finally, Figure 5 shows two series of 
decreasing contrasts between the central squares and surrounding discs. While the edges of 
the squares are clearly visible in the leftmost images, they become increasingly indistinct as 
we progress right, finally becoming invisible.  
                                                        
12 Such effects provide important motivation for the relationalist colour ontology of Cohen (2009). 
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Figure 5 
From these observations, it seems that both magnitudes and directions (in colour 
space) of chromatic contrast may influence the visual appearance of edges. Gestalt 
psychologist Susanne Liebmann (1927, reproduced in West et al. 1996: 1461) examined these 
influences by assessing the appearance of borders between equiluminant stimuli,  
 
How do figures appear when they are different in colour but equal in brightness to the 
ground? In which way do colours without a brightness difference contribute to the 
perceived existence of figures, bodies, things, and the structure of the visual 
environment? 
 
She describes the now eponymous Liebmann Effect (1996: 1461), 
 
When … figures are perceived, then generally everything is soft, jellylike, colloidal. 
The figure does not stand out from the ground. It is not only there with blurred 
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contours, but the whole of it is diffuse and ill-defined. Drastic figural changes occur… 
There are in psychology only a few phenomenal changes of so drastic a nature. 
 
Some authors have taken these effects to indicate that colour vision cannot support any sort 
of form segmentation.13 As Mollon (1989: 30) notes, however, this overplays the extent of 
the effects, which vary with the type of colour contrast – along with other factors.14 In a 
minority of cases, figural boundaries are lost altogether. Otherwise, subjects perceive edges 
of varying quality and distinctness. In approximate order, contours are ‘softest’ for 
equiluminant blue-green pairs, followed by blue-yellow, green-yellow, yellow-red, red-green, 
and blue-red (1996: 1474-6).15 In general, the effects are stronger for lower saturation 
colours. Note that edge softness/hardness is not a simple function of the ‘proximity’ or 
contrast magnitude between the two colours: the direction matters. For example, equally 
discriminable blue-green and red-blue pairs form borders that appear different in 
softness/hardness. 
The chromatic edge model provides a good explanation of these effects. The apparent 
‘softness’ or ‘hardness’ of an edge seems to vary with the magnitude and direction of 
chromatic contrast between the regions bounded by that edge. As noted above, I assume that 
edges are represented in visual perception, and that discriminable differences in edge 
appearance license inferences about differences in edge representation. The noted differences 
in edge appearance thus indicate differences in edge representation that vary with magnitudes 
                                                        
13 Livingstone & Hubel (1987: 3444; 1988: 747). 
14 For example, the effects are stronger for small, narrow, figures than large, broad figures, and stronger for 
complicated than simple figures. 
15 C.f. Koffka’s (1936: 127) distinction between ‘hard’ colours such as red, which ‘segregates best,’ and ‘soft’ 
colours such as blue, which ‘segregates least.’ Interestingly, opponent colour pairs of blue-yellow and red-green 
do not form the ‘hardest’ edges. Red-green edges are among the hardest, but no harder than non-opponent 
pairings of blue-red. Blue-yellow edges are among the softest. I reemphasise that the familiar opponent colour 
space is thus unlikely to be appropriate for modelling chromatic edge content. 
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and directions of chromatic contrast. It is plausible, then, that these differences in edge 
representation are, straightforwardly, differences in the representation of magnitudes and 
directions of chromatic contrast. 
 One might object that this is not how edges look to us. Edges look smooth, jagged, 
soft, hard, distinct, indistinct; they do not look red-blue-contrast-type or red-green-contrast-
type. In response, though, who says that edges do not look such ways to us? Clearly, we don’t 
ordinarily use chromatic contrast terms to describe edges. But this directly undermines my 
view only if we assume that all properties attributed in visual perception must be 
conceptualised by the subject. I reject that assumption. Moreover, in light of the Liebmann 
experiments, it seems not implausible that a subject could come to describe edges in such 
ways, given suitable motivation. The following case presses this point. 
  Suppose we train a subject to become expert in discriminating differences in edge 
qualities between pairs of equiluminant colour stimuli. Their samples include figures of 
various shades of blue against backgrounds of various shades of green, and vice versa; red 
figures against yellow backgrounds, and vice versa; and so on. Once they reach ceiling on 
this discrimination task, we train them on an identification task. For every discriminable type 
of edge quality, they learn which (ordered) pairs of colours form edges of this type. Given a 
blue14 figure on red31 background, for example, they can identify the edge as having the same 
quality as blue13 on red32, but also (say) purple5 on orange2, and so on. We then encourage 
them to form cognitive categories for these different quality types, and introduce names for 
them. They may then say, of a given edge, ‘that looks like a such-and-such edge,’ where 
‘such-and-such’ denotes a category that includes blue13 on red32, purple5 on orange2, and so 
on. These categories might not map neatly onto familiar categories such as red-green-
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contrast: the categories would likely be sui generis.16 Nonetheless, this subject would 
describe how edges look using categories of chromatic contrast. If you find this believable, 
you should be open to the idea that edges have distinctive contrast-dependent looks. 
 3.2. Cerebral Achromatopsia 
Cerebral achromatopsia is a selective impairment in the ability to see monadic colour 
properties, resulting from cortical rather than retinal abnormalities. Complete cerebral 
achromatopsics seem to have entirely achromatic visual perception. They fail standard 
diagnostic tests for colour vision, involving discrimination of isoluminant stimuli, colour 
naming, and ordering samples of colour chips. Despite these failures, studies reveal a 
surprising amount of spared processing within the colour vision system. A complete 
achromatopsic known as ‘MS’ was found to have a spectral sensitivity function consistent 
with preserved colour-opponent processing. He could detect contours in sinusoidal gratings 
made up from isoluminant hues, coloured shapes embedded in static or dynamic grey 
backgrounds, and could detect the direction of movement of an isoluminant chromatic grating 
(Cowey & Heywood, 1995). 
 Several commentators have suggested that cerebral achromatopsics perform these 
tasks by virtue of preserved ‘colour-for-form’ processing.17 A first indication was that some 
achromatopsics could detect the figures in Ishihara colour plates at a distance of two metres, 
though not at normal reading distance. At normal reading distance, the dominant contrasts in 
these plates are the varying luminance contrasts between the small coloured discs. As Mollon 
and colleagues (1980: 133) note, however, at two metres ‘the luminance contours of 
individual discs are no longer resolved and the dominant contour is the hue boundary 
between figure and ground.’ Patients report seeing a figure embedded within the display and 
                                                        
16 See footnotes 11 and 15. 
17 Shevell & Kingdom (2008: 152), Chirimuuta & Kingdom (2015: 226). 
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can accurately name it and trace its outline, though they report not seeing the colours of the 
discs. 
 Subsequent studies have further probed this spared capacity. Kentridge and colleagues 
(2004a: 822) sought to assess ‘the nature of the local chromatic contrast signals that can be 
accessed and discriminated by the visual system independently of their role in the perception 
of constant surface colour.’ They strikingly claim that ‘a cortically colour blind observer 
[MS] perceives chromatic local-contrast signals,’ (2004a: 829, italics added). One 
discrimination task sought to test whether MS could discriminate magnitudes and directions 
of chromatic contrast. MS had to identify the odd one out among three coloured discs, 
presented against a uniformly coloured background, as in Figure 6. For example, image (b) 
consists of three green discs against a yellow background. Two of the discs were identical, 
with cone-contrasts of 27.5% from the background. The third disc varied between cone-
contrast increments of 75%, 62.5%, or 50% from the reference contrast. While clearly 
abnormal, MS was able to distinguish the odd one out at all three contrast increments, though 
his performance was worse for the smaller increments (2004a: 825-6). They also found that 
MS could discriminate contrasts of equal magnitude in the opposing directions of redness and 
greenness, as in image (d). MS viewed three discs with equal cone-contrasts of 27.5% from 
the yellow background, but two of the discs were red (green) and one of the discs was green 
(red). MS successfully discriminated the odd disc on 80 out of 96 trials, considerably better 
than chance (2004a: 826). 
 
Figure 6 (Reprinted with permission from Kentridge et al. 2004a) 
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Tellingly, Kentridge and colleagues attribute MS’s task performance to his ability to 
discriminate differences in the appearance of the edges of the discs. MS himself reports that 
the edges of the discs look different, and that this is how he can tell the odd one out. This fits 
a wider pattern. In an earlier study, MS discriminated sequences of isoluminant squares 
ordered in respect of colour, from sequences of randomly ordered squares. Heywood and 
colleagues (1991: 802) reported that MS’s ‘verbal replies showed that he did so by detecting 
an edge between two stimuli that were, to him, perceptually identical.’ They claimed that 
these edges differed in ‘salience’ for MS, though they did not explain this notion. 
In further support of the edge-based interpretation, MS’s performance on the task fell 
to chance when the discs were surrounded by black annuli, as in Figure 7. This issue requires 
considerable care. A first gloss is that the annulus obscures the edge between disc and 
background, concealing the chromatic contrast information underlying MS’s discriminations. 
Note, however, that the image still contains differing chromatic contrasts between the red and 
green discs and the black annuli. Why cannot MS discriminate these contrasts? Kentridge and 
colleagues (2004a: 828) surmise that MS’s ‘access to these [chromatic edge] cues is…. 
disrupted by coincident luminance contours.’ That is, whereas MS can discriminate the ‘pure’ 
chromatic contrasts between equiluminant discs and background, he seems unable to 
discriminate ‘mixed’ chromatic and luminance contrasts between discs and annuli, and annuli 
and background. 
 
Figure 7 (Reprinted with permission from Kentridge et al. 2004a) 
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Now, although this evidence supports an edge-based explanation of MS’s abilities, it 
actually threatens to undermine the chromatic edge model. The model proposes that edge 
representations have chromatic contrast content. At first pass, however, MS’s inability to 
discriminate the chromatic contrasts in Figure 7 suggests that his edge representations 
conflate chromatic with luminance contrast. Indeed, Kentridge and colleagues (2004a: 828) 
hypothesise that MS’s edge representation is related to the activity of cells with ‘mixed 
colour-luminance opponency’, which are ‘good candidates for the mediation of the 
perception of form from colour.’ They reason that, 
 
[I]f the luminance sensitivities of the centre and surround balance then the cell will 
respond exclusively to the chromatic contrast of a border. If, however, the luminance 
sensitivities of centre and surround differ, then the cell will respond to both chromatic 
and luminance borders. 
 
Placing this in broader context, a common criterion for the possession of colour vision is the 
ability to discriminate differences in light wavelength, independent of changes in light 
intensity.18 If these variables are confounded in the subject’s visual response, then they do not 
possess colour vision. It seems, however, that MS is unable to discriminate differences in 
chromatic contrast independent of changes in luminance contrast. By parity of reasoning, we 
may doubt whether MS can visually represent chromatic contrast. 
 In response, it is important not to overstate the extent to which MS’s visual 
representations conflate chromatic and luminance contrast. It does seem that MS cannot 
                                                        
18 For detailed discussion of such discrimination-based criteria for colour vision, see Davies (2018). 
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discriminate chromatic contrasts coincident with very large luminance contrasts, as with the 
black annuli. MS is nonetheless able to discriminate chromatic contrasts coincident with 
small luminance contrasts, as Heywood and colleagues (1994: 252) report,19  
 
[MS was] strikingly unimpaired at detecting a single coloured square concealed in a 
grey checkerboard when the colour is maximally saturated and the range of luminance 
contrasts is small. In short, saturated chromatic and achromatic boundaries are 
conspicuously different to M.S., particularly in dynamic displays, when they are of 
similar luminance contrast. Increasing the luminance contrast of the achromatic 
boundary renders the achromatic and chromatic boundaries perceptually similar. 
 
Images A and B of Figure 8 are examples where MS failed and succeeded, respectively, to 
detect the ‘different’ patch in a 7x5 checkerboard display. In both cases, the edges between 
the target square and the surrounding squares have coincident chromatic and luminance 
contrasts. When the range of luminance values is within 19.4-38.48cd/m2, as in image A, MS 
can detect the coloured square. Under similar conditions, MS also ‘readily detected a red 
square concealed among greens of random, but similar luminances,’ (1994: 249). When the 
luminance range increases to 0.01-122.2 cd/m2, MS can no longer detect the target. 
Remarkably, however, MS was able to locate a coloured form, such as a cross or large 
square, embedded in an array of small squares varying widely in saturation and/or luminance. 
In image E, for example, MS ‘swiftly and deftly located the concealed cross,’ and in F he 
‘flawlessly performed a pattern discrimination between two squares and a cross,’ (1994: 251). 
                                                        
19 Thanks to Kathleen Akins for alerting me to this point. 
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Figure 8 (reproduced from Heywood et al. 1994) 
This last finding is particularly striking. When the target and distractors are of the 
same shape and size, as in A and B, MS can dissociate coincident chromatic and luminance 
contrasts, so long as the total range of luminance values is fairly small. When the target and 
distractors differ in shape and size, as in E and F, however, MS is able to dissociate 
coincident chromatic and luminance contrasts, even when the range of luminance values is 
quite large. It is unclear what to make of this. One hypothesis is that the ‘decision’ to 
preserve a chromatic contrast signal is not a spatially local matter. Detecting the cross in E, 
for example, might involve comparing the chromatic and luminance contrasts across a 
medium-range spatial ‘window,’ to determine whether there is any pattern in the chromatic 
contrasts that suggests the presence of a form. As a rough heuristic, if no such larger pattern 
is discerned, then chromatic and luminance contrast can be processed together. If a larger 
pattern is discerned, then it behoves form integration to keep the chromatic contrast signal 
separate. Preserving a chromatic contrast, then, might be a context- or task-dependent matter. 
In Akins’ (1996: 353-4) evocative phrase, perhaps the form integration system places 
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‘narcissistic’ demands for chromatic information, as required to segment the scene. When 
such information is needed, it is bound with local edge representations, to facilitate the 
‘linking’ of these segments into coherent object boundaries.20 When it is not, perhaps the 
chromatic edge model does not apply.21 
Cerebral achromatopsia forms an important part of my argument for the chromatic 
edge model. As such, I shall now consider three objections, and offer replies. The first 
objection is that MS’s task performance might reflect a type of blindsight for monadic colour, 
rather than chromatic edge representation.22 After all, his behaviour fits the classic blindsight 
pattern of preserved visual discrimination, despite severely impaired visual experience. 
However, blindsight patients deny having seen the stimuli, and must be encouraged to make 
guesses. MS needs no such encouragement. As Heywood and colleagues (1998: 413) report, 
‘in no case, is a patient required to “guess” the identity of an invisible figure concealed in the 
colour plates.’ Rather, ‘residual processing, of whatever origin, resulted in a conscious 
perceptual change, notwithstanding the absence of colour qualia,’ (1998: 415). Similarly, 
when presented with image E in Figure 8, Heywood and colleagues (1994: 251) observed that 
MS ‘swiftly and deftly located the concealed cross... Moreover, he did not merely detect a 
target; when asked he described its shape both visually and by drawing a cross with his 
finger.’ 
The second objection is that MS might have residual visual representations of 
monadic colours, but of a degraded or unusual sort, not describable using ordinary colour 
                                                        
20 C.f. Kingdom et al. (1992) on chromatic ‘contour linking processes.’ 
21 This suggests a pluralism about our edge representation capacities. In Davies (2016), I appeal to context- and 
task-dependence in our colour constancy capacities to argue for a similarly pluralistic view of constancy.  
22 ‘Blindsight’ here means type 1 blindsight, where patients supposedly have no awareness of stimuli presented 
in the impaired visual field, yet can discriminate some of their properties. Type 2 blindsighters have some 
residual awareness of stimuli in their ‘blind’ field, which facilitates discrimination. This residual awareness 
might be severely degraded or unusual. An alternative interpretation, then, is that MS has type 2 blindsight, 
perhaps involving awareness of partial or alien colours. I consider this objection below. 
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concepts. For example, MS might represent ‘partial colours,’ qualities defined by at most two 
of the standard three dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness: for example, hue with 
neither saturation nor lightness, or saturation and lightness without hue.23 Alternatively, MS 
might represent ‘alien colours,’ properties located in quality spaces quite different to our own 
hue, saturation, and lightness space.24  
My first response is that neither suggestion fits with patients’ first-person 
descriptions. Complete cerebral achromatopsics routinely claim that the world appears ‘drab 
and grey’ (Cowey & Heywood, 1995: 90) or ‘drained of colour’ (Heywood et al., 1987: 22). 
It is unclear why they would say this, if they perceive partial or alien colours. If patients 
perceived partial colours, we might predict that they would describe the world as appearing 
‘coloured, but washed-out,’ rather than ‘drab and grey.’ Similarly, if patients perceived alien 
colours, why would they say the world looks ‘drained of colour,’ as opposed to ‘unusually 
coloured?’ Both proposals seem unmotivated. 
Second, there is no behavioural evidence for partial or alien colour representation. Of 
course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Nonetheless, if MS had partial colour 
representations involving hue, for example, we would predict a capacity to identify at least 
coarse-grain or determinable hue categories, such as red or green. MS has no such ability. 
Interestingly, Victor and colleagues (1989) did find evidence of partial colour representation 
in a patient with partial cerebral achromatopsia – so-called ‘dyschromatopsia’. Their patient 
identified the red bars of a grating as ‘red,’ and a green patch as ‘tan or light green.’ To date, 
MS has produced no such reports. Similarly, if MS had alien colour representations, then we 
would predict some discernible order in his groupings of colour stimuli. MS’s score on the 
Farnsworth-Munsell 100 hue test, however, is no better than achievable by responding 
                                                        
23 Brown (2014). Thanks to a referee for raising this possibility. 
24 MacPherson (2015: 120).  
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randomly (Heywood et al. 1994: 246-7). As MacPherson (2015: 120) notes, if MS represents 
alien colours, it is also unclear why we can thwart his ability to complete the odd one out task 
by surrounding the discs with black annuli. Moreover, the alien colour hypothesis fails to 
explain why MS is able to detect the green and red crosses in images E and F of Figure 8, but 
not a single green or red square embedded within similar arrays. 
 My third response presents a fall-back position. Suppose I am wrong, and that MS 
does perceptually represent partial or alien colours. It would not immediately follow that 
these representations provide a superior explanation of all of MS’s colour-related 
discriminations. Suppose MS represents partial colours with saturation and lightness 
dimensions, but no hue dimension. This might explain some of his discriminations, but not 
all, given that MS can discriminate equiluminant figures that differ in hue but not saturation. 
Similarly, suppose MS represents alien colours, wherein human-red stimuli and human-green 
stimuli do not map to opponent alien colours. Again, this might explain some of MS’s 
discriminations, but not all, given that MS makes various discriminations indicative of red-
green opponent processing. Depending on the details, then, partial or alien colour hypotheses 
may still leave room for explanations via the chromatic edge model. 
 The third and final objection is that, even if the chromatic edge explanation of MS’s 
abilities is correct, I haven’t ruled out the possibility that MS computes chromatic contrasts 
from very low-level monadic colour representations.25 To paint a picture, suppose the early 
colour vision system is pointillist, attributing monadic colour properties to all locations in the 
scene. It uses these point-colours to compute chromatic contrasts, which get into edge 
representations in the way I describe. Later on, however, the system loses the point-colours, 
                                                        
25 Thanks to a referee for raising this objection. 
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leaving only the chromatic edge representations. This is consistent with the causal MDT, if 
not the metaphysical MDT. 
 In reply, it seems extremely unlikely that early colour vision is pointillist in this sense. 
Vision scientists almost universally agree that low levels of the visual system code stimulus 
contrasts, rather than absolute values. As Hardin (1988: 27) notes, ‘the common 
informational currency of the chromatic visual system consists entirely of output differences 
which are a function of… cone-excitation ratios.’ As we shall see in the next sub-Section, the 
neural substrates for chromatic edge representation might be as early as V1 or V2. At least on 
a simple hierarchical, feedforward, view of colour processing, there is no reason to think that 
these regions code for monadic colour properties. Things are more complicated on a recurrent 
processing view, and I do not have space to digress here. I argue in Section 4, however, that 
fans of predictive coding or Bayesian architectures should still reject the MDT in favour of a 
no priority view, rather than the relations or contrast first view suggested by the simple 
feedforward architecture. 
3.3. Neuroscience of border ownership 
My view is that we perceptually represent edges holistically with geometric, topological, and 
chromatic features. In support of the holistic representation of geometric and chromatic 
features, the vast majority of cells in V1 and V2 have been found to be selective, in varying 
degrees, for both colour and orientation information (Friedman and colleagues, 2003: 602). 
Gheorghiu and Kingdom (2007: 1946) describe colour and orientation as ‘conjointly 
represented’ at this stage of visual processing. Shapley and Hawken (2011: 701) infer that 
‘colour and form… are inextricably linked as properties of objects in visual perception and in 
the visual cortex.’ Gegenfurtner and Kiper (2003: 192) take such evidence to ‘contradict the 
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idea that colour information is treated solely by a dedicated, specialized population of 
neurons in V1 and V2.’ 
 My main concern is with the holistic representation of topological and chromatic 
features. Figure-ground phenomena suggest that we represent edges as ‘belonging’ to figural 
regions rather than grounds.26 Zhou and colleagues (2000: 6595) present evidence from 
macaques, indicating that ‘this perceptual tendency to assign borders to objects is reflected in 
the neural activity at early cortical levels.’ They found evidence of cells jointly ‘coding 
border ownership and polarity of edge contrast,’ where ‘polarity’ means the spatial 
orientation of the contrast, such as whether a contrast from red to green occurs from left to 
right, rather than right to left, relative to the subject’s position (2000: 6597). These cells 
pervade V1, V2, and V4. For example, around 44% of the edge-selective cells in V2 were of 
this type. Figure 9 shows the activity of one such cell. The peak firing rate for this cell 
involved stimuli with a horizontal edge between dark red and grey, with the grey ‘above’ the 
dark red, where the edge is the top edge of a dark red figure, as in C. An edge with the exact 
same spatial contrast polarity, but which is the bottom edge of a grey figure as in D, does not 
produce much response at all.27  
                                                        
26 See Davies (m.s.) for further discussion. 
27 Friedman et al. (2003: 602) report similar results. 
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Figure 9 (Reprinted with permission from Zhou et al. 2000) 
Clearly, we should be cautious drawing conclusions from such evidence for theories 
of perceptual representation. I will provide more detailed evaluation in future work. The 
evidence is nonetheless extremely suggestive. It seems that macaque visual cortex encodes 
edge information in a holistic way, with many cells responding only in the presence of stimuli 
that combine specific geometric (i.e. orientation), topological (i.e. border ownership), and 
chromatic (i.e. directed contrast) features. These cells’ activity correlates closely with 
perception, in that border ownership signals almost always correspond with the macaque’s 
(presumed) awareness of simple square figures (2000: 6607). The leap from here to human 
vision is fraught. With due caution, however, I note that the differentiation of chromatic 
contrast types among edge-detection cells in macaques coheres with the human behavioural 
evidence for contrast-dependent aspects of edge perception discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
Although inconclusive, the data therefore provide confirmatory evidence for the chromatic 
edge model. 
3.4. Function and Binding 
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My final argument concerns functional constraints on content attribution. I consider both 
input- and output-side constraints, focusing more on the latter. Regarding the input-side, the 
evidence from Liebmann and cerebral achromatopsia suggests that variations in the 
chromatic contrasts of stimuli produce variations in certain aspects of edge perception, and 
that such variations can be perceptually discriminated. We have also seen that certain edge-
selective cells in macaque cortex respond selectively to directed chromatic contrasts. It seems 
unambiguous, then, that chromatic contrast is among the stimulus properties causally 
implicated in the production of visual edge representations. I shall not further rehash material 
in arguing this point.  
Output-side issues prove more contentious. Although it is hard to find clear textual 
evidence, my impression is that many vision scientists assume that this input-side role 
exhausts the colour-related function of edge representation. That is, they assume that 
chromatic contrast information merely feeds into edge detection, helping the system figure 
out where the edges are. Clark (2000: §6.4) suggests a similar view, whereby sensitivity to 
chromatic contrast is useful for ‘camouflage breaking,’ detecting surface boundaries for the 
purposes of object differentiation and scene segmentation.28 If the goal were merely to detect 
the presence of an edge, however, then presumably there would be no need for the system to 
use precious bandwidth retaining chromatic information to represent the type of edge that has 
been detected.29 
 Against this view, I argue that output-side functions indicate that edge representations  
sometimes have chromatic contrast content.30 Regarding ‘long-arm’ functional role, I argued 
above that MS’s edge perception guides his behaviour on implicit colour tasks. For example, 
                                                        
28 C.f. Akins (2014: 200-1).  
29 Mullen et al., (2000: §4.1) consider related arguments for a single ‘contour extraction mechanism’ sensitive to 
chromatic information only at its input. 
30 ‘Sometimes,’ because depending on the context/task, it might not be necessary or beneficial for the visual 
system to represent such contrasts. 
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it seems that differences in MS’s perception of the edges in Figure 6b enable him to select the 
odd one out among the three green stimuli. While MS does not describe the stimuli or their 
edges in chromatic terms, his behaviour is clearly sensitive to differences in chromatic 
contrast. This provides good reason to attribute chromatic contrast content to his visual edge 
representations, for these representations seemingly drive the colour-sensitive behaviour. 
Regarding ‘short-arm’ functional role, my argument centres on the putative 
consumption of edge representations by processes involved in generating monadic colour 
representations. This is speculative, as we do not fully understand these interactions. 
Nonetheless, as Kentridge and colleagues note (2004b: 162), on many candidate theories, 
‘edge processing… [is] a starting point for surface colour perception’. Suppose that’s right. 
And assume, as argued above, that edge processing is sensitive to chromatic contrast at its 
input. Now, the input-side-only view is that the edge representation process discards all this 
chromatic contrast information at its output. As Gegenfurtner (2003: 568-9) observes, 
however, this ‘implies that the visual system would compute a colour signal for detecting 
edges, only to ignore it later on when determining the colour of the edge.’ In terms of ideal 
systems design, it would make sense to retain this information, because chromatic contrast 
provides excellent information about the colours of the surfaces bounded by the edge. For 
example, an edge contrast of 17 units in the red direction tells us that the figure lies 
somewhere between 17 and the upper bound on the red dimension. Another edge contrast 
elsewhere of -10 units in the red direction tells us that, in fact, the figure must lie between 17 
and 10-units-short of the upper bound on the red dimension.31 If surface colour processes 
                                                        
31 See the discussion of Morrison (forthcoming) on ‘region narrowing’ in the next Section. One complication is 
that, as noted above, the colour space for chromatic edge content is likely to differ from that for monadic colour 
content. Any constraints posed by the former on the latter therefore would involve translation between spaces. I 
will follow up on this in future work. Thanks to Nick Shea for discussion. 
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consume edge representations, the ideal would be to ‘tag’ these representations with 
chromatic contrast features. 
 Friedman and colleagues (2003: 610) present a related argument, 
 
[T]he factorial representation of colour and border information… appears as a 
purposeful design that ensures that colour information is carried along with form 
information… If colour and form information were represented in separate maps at 
this level, special mechanisms would be needed to “bind” these attributes together for 
a given object. However, such maps apparently do not exist in the monkey visual 
cortex. 
 
The key point is that tagging edge representations with chromatic features short-circuits the 
binding problem. It is notoriously difficult to discern how, or where, the visual system binds 
putatively separate representations of colour and form together in a unified representation of 
a coloured surface. Friedman and colleagues suggest that that is because these representations 
are not, in fact, separate: border signals carry chromatic information. This supports the 
chromatic edge model, though note that my view is that edge representations have chromatic 
contrast content, rather than colour content per se, as Friedman and colleagues seem to 
suggest. Nevertheless, if surface colour is computed from these contrast representations, then 
we still obviate the need for binding, because the contrasts are already ‘bound’ in a holistic 
representation of the edges of the surface. 
4. Alternatives to the MDT 
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The chromatic edge model shows how a visual perceptual system might represent colour 
relations without representing any colours. This undermines the orthodox MDT, on which 
monadic colour representation determines relational colour representation. This Section 
surveys alternative views. Given space limitations, I remain neutral on which should be 
preferred. 
 The relations first view holds that visual perceptual representation of colour relations 
determines the visual perceptual representation of monadic colours. This inverts the standard 
order of explanation. An analogous view of visual spatial perception would be that representing 
objects as standing in certain spatial relations determines our representation of these objects as 
having particular spatial locations. Applied to temporal perception, representing temporal 
succession would be explanatorily prior to representing events as occurring at particular times. 
As before, we could take this as a metaphysical thesis, on which the relational grounds the 
monadic; or as a causal thesis, on which hypothetical mechanisms compute monadic colours 
from collections of relational colour representations. 
The causal relations first view has not been defended to date. I plan to discuss it in 
future work.  Morrison (2015) defends the metaphysical relations first view. In an interesting 
development, Morrison (forthcoming) suggests that Evie’s total lifetime experience of the 
colour relations borne by the strawberry to other objects grounds her current visual perception 
of its colour. This monadic colour representation may be more or less determinate, depending 
on how far her prior relational perception narrows down the region of colour space into which 
the strawberry falls. By analogy, given two points a and b in the unit interval [0, 1], if a is 0.2 
to the left of b, this determines that a is in the region [0, .8], b is in [.2, 1]. If we add the 
information that a third object c is 0.3 to the right of b, this narrows things down further, such 
that a must be in the region [0, .5], b in [.2, .7], and c in [.5, 1]. 
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An important difference from my view is that Morrison does not endorse – or entertain 
– the possibility of relational colour representation without monadic colour representation. 
Morrison’s view is that any relational colour representation, however minimal, suffices for 
some type of monadic colour representation. In early infancy, when Evie represents a colour 
relation for the first time, she will at least represent the relata as coloured, or perhaps highly-
determinably-red or highly-determinably-green. One possible motivation for this view is that 
it avoids having to explain how monadic colour representation emerges from the relational at 
a certain level of complexity. By analogy, panpsychists avoid the thorny issue of explaining 
how minds emerge at some level of neural complexity, by holding that any neural state suffices 
for some type of mentality.32 Another possible motivation is that the intuitive pictorial, 
pointillist, view of perception makes it hard to conceive what it might be like to represent colour 
relations without representing any colours. 
The chromatic edge model undercuts the second motivation. It aids the positive 
imagination of cases in which visual perception represents colour relations between objects, 
despite failing to represent their colours. Regarding the first motivation, I see no problem in 
principle with the view that monadic colour representation emerges only given a certain 
complexity in relational representation. Similarly, the majority view is that some collections of 
neural states do not suffice for any mentality, perhaps because they are too basic, or not 
organised in the right way. With concessions on these points, a defender of the metaphysical 
relations first view could endorse my account. 
A second, no priority view holds that there are no relations of causal or metaphysical 
determination between visual perceptual representation of monadic colours and colour 
relations. This broad view is consistent with various more specific metaphysical and causal 
                                                        
32 Nagel (1979).  
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theses. On the metaphysical side, at one extreme is the view that the grounds for monadic and 
relational colour representation are completely distinct and non-overlapping. At the other 
extreme is the view that these types have precisely the same grounds. On the causal side, at 
one extreme is the view there is no causal interaction whatsoever between the mechanisms of 
monadic and relational colour representation. A moderate view is that these types emerge 
from complex, looping, interactions between multiple mechanisms, operating in parallel 
rather than in sequence. At the other extreme is the view that these types result from a single 
computational mechanism. This latter view might appeal to fans of hierarchical Bayesian 
architectures.33 Perhaps an internally generated representation of monadic colour (the prior) is 
‘tested’ against the sensory input, consisting of relational colour representations. A mismatch 
produces a prediction error signal, and the monadic colour representation is ‘updated.’ 
Papineau (2015) endorses a no priority view, although it is unclear exactly where it falls 
in the above taxonomy. Papineau’s view is that monadic and relational colour representations 
result from two distinct, doubly-dissociable, mechanisms. He postulates a ‘difference detector 
mechanism’ that issues in relational colour percepts, which represent directions and 
magnitudes of colour contrast. This difference detector can function independently from a 
‘colour classifier’ mechanism, which issues categorical monadic colour percepts. As such, 
Papineau – unlike Morrison, but like me – allows the possibility of primitive relational colour 
representation. Also like me, Papineau draws on data concerning cerebral achromatopsia to 
support this view. The argument of Section 3.2 addresses various complications not considered 
by Papineau. A further substantive difference is that Papineau does not characterise ‘difference 
detection’ in terms of edge representation.34 His view (2015: 274, italics added) is that 
‘detection of colour differences is a gestalt phenomenon: we can often consciously see straight 
                                                        
33 Thanks to a referee for prompting me to consider this issue. 
34 Papineau (2015: 283) mentions the role of colour vision in form detection, but does not develop his account in 
this direction. 
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off that two adjacent surfaces are different in colour without first consciously having two 
different responses to each surface.’ The notion of ‘Gestalt colour differences’ is not explained, 
and would benefit from further analysis. It might be consistent with the chromatic edge view; 
it might not.  
5. Conclusion: Colour Relations in Form 
The empiricists’ analogy between visual perception and painting makes the MDT seem 
inevitable. One constructive project of this paper has been to argue that an iconic, quasi-
pictorial, view of perceptual content does not in fact necessitate the MDT. Whereas standard 
views build up the representation from pixels or surface regions with monadic colour values, 
the chromatic edge model introduces contrast content at the ground floor, in the edge 
primitives: colour relations in form. In the limit case, this allows for the representation of 
chromatic contrast between two regions, in the absence of any representations of their 
monadic colours. The second constructive project has been to argue that this model might be 
true of creatures like us. Each of the empirical arguments in Section 3 warrants a paper in its 
own right. This paper consolidates these issues to present the strongest case for the package 
view. As for the preferred alternative to the MDT, my views will have to await another 
occasion.35 
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